Partial Justice: The Peril of Judicial Elections

In the American system of justice, judges are expected to perform their role apart from the “political thicket,” free of political pressure and indifferent to public opinion.1 Yet today, in most states, this basic requisite of independent and impartial administration of the rule of law is imperiled. Where judges hold or retain office by election, the independence of the judiciary is at risk. Elections encourage judges to raise campaign contributions and appeal to voters. They provide special interests with substantial opportunities to politicize judicial decisions and influence judicial behavior. Elected judges find it hard to avoid becoming entangled in the political thicket. Selection by election does not befit the role of a judge in our legal process.

An alarming number of judicial elections have become politically charged and divisive contests, characterized by increasingly large campaign expenditures and interest group electioneering. In many instances, judicial campaigns have come to resemble those waged by partisan politicians, contests in which fundraising is considered a key to success and expensive television advertising the principal means of communicating with voters. Most of the money raised by judicial candidates comes from attorneys and parties who may later appear before them in court or who have a particular interest in the outcome of adjudications. Interest groups are also increasingly involved, sometimes spending more than the candidates themselves in hopes of influencing judicial decisions. Consequently, judicial elections are too often serving as arenas of conflict for competing interests who hope to elect judges whom they perceive to favor their views—or oust those who do not.