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As the world marked three years since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, a flurry of extraordinary diplomacy – and unprecedented tensions between the US and Europe – colored the anniversary. This was followed by a dramatic and tense meeting between the US and Ukraine and serious questions over continued US support even as Ukraine and the US continue to negotiate an agreement on development of Ukraine’s mineral and other resources. After the US-Russia meeting in Riyadh on February 18, which excluded Ukraine, Europe was alarmed at the dramatic change in both tone and diplomatic posture. This followed several other incidents, including the Vice President’s remarks at the Munich Security Conference and Secretary of Defense Hegseth’s comments on reducing overall military support for Europe, which highlighted a new strategic reality for Europe in the new Administration. The meetings in Riyadh focused not only on Ukraine but also on a more general reset of US-Russia relations to the alarm of European allies, and US actions included a false assertion that Ukraine started the war (Russia first invaded in 2014, broke a ceasefire, and then launched a general invasion in 2022); that President Zelensky was a “dictator without elections” (Ukraine’s constitution prohibits elections following a declaration of martial law, which the Supreme Rada of Ukraine has repeatedly renewed); and voting with Russia, Iran, and North Korea at the UN on a resolution on the third anniversary of the war (China abstained). While European leaders have rushed to Washington to discuss broader issues (including the prospect of tariffs), at the base of the concerns is an increasingly sharp divergence between the US and Europe on Ukraine amidst pressure from Washington for a quick deal, even (as in Riyadh) without Ukraine at the table and the US taking a position more distant from Ukraine and instead simply for “peace.” Yet in the search for peace or even a more limited ceasefire, the basic issues remain the same: does Ukraine have a realistic chance to recover territory it has lost? How much territory would Ukraine be willing to give up for peace and on what terms? Is a ceasefire a meaningful alternative to a peace deal, even though President Zelensky has stated he does not want a “frozen” conflict as in Georgia or Moldova? What security guarantees are Western countries, including the US, prepared to give Ukraine – and would Russia have to agree to them? Last year, President Zelensky suggested that the US and Ukraine could jointly develop Ukraine’s resources following the war, as a way to encourage the US to remain involved in Ukraine’s future. The idea took hold but shifted in emphasis. As the President recently said, “when Americans put up their money . . . we’re getting our money back in some form”; “the American taxpayer is now going to get their money back, plus.” The formula, however, both ignores the fact that the aid was given and does not include proposals for Russia, as the aggressor, to pay, as the money would not have had to be given absent the war. (The US has given about $66 billion in military aid to Ukraine and about $52 billion in humanitarian and other aid over the last three years; Europe has collectively given about $139 billion.) The US reportedly then proposed a plan which would essentially have forced Ukraine to pay up to $500 billion, perhaps for generations; Ukraine rejected that but countered with a plan of its own, while also pushing for formal US security guarantees as part of the deal. The US, however, was cool on the idea of security guarantees, with the President saying “I’m not going to make security guarantees beyond very much. We’re going to have Europe do that” and adding “NATO [membership] you can forget about. I think that’s probably the reason the whole thing started.” This is an argument long made by Russia but rejected by the West, which points to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine since 2014 and Ukraine’s right to freely choose to join the EU and NATO if it wishes and other member states agree. Still, the US and Ukraine agreed the terms of a minerals deal (eventually not signed on February 28) which reportedly included one reference that “America supports efforts to guarantee security” but no explicit security guarantees, even as President Zelensky also stated that “if we don’t get security guarantees, we won’t have a ceasefire, nothing will work [.]” French President Emmanuel Macron proposed a limited truce on air, sea, and infrastructure to test Russian seriousness. Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov repeated that military action would cease only with a satisfactory outcome for Russia. During Macron’s visit to Washington, the President said that “Europe must take a central role in ensuring the long-term security of Ukraine,” suggesting instead that that the US minerals deal would be a security “backstop, you could say” – but the guarantee is vague and does not imply the presence of US troops. The exact terms of the deal were uncertain. The reference to $500 billion was apparently removed, and Ukraine spoke of a “joint investment fund” – a significant improvement over the previous US draft. Senator Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH), ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, noted that “40-50% of those mineral deposits are actually in territory controlled by the Russians. Maybe part of the deal is President Trump is going to get a deal with Vladimir Putin on the mineral rights too. So … that could be a little tricky.” Russia seemed to confirm this intuition, with President Putin suggesting that exploration for rare earths could occur in parts of eastern Ukraine occupied by Russia, and President Trump speaking in late February of “major economic development transactions with Russia [.]” Minerals and security guarantees thus set the backdrop for the meeting at the White House on February 28. While parts of the meeting were positive, including praise for the “unbelievably brave” Ukrainian troops, the President hastened to add that the point of the deal was that Ukraine is “not going to go back to fighting [.]” The meeting went off course when the Vice President praised diplomacy and President Zelensky responded that Putin had broken previous diplomatic agreements, at which point the Vice President said Zelensky was organizing “propaganda tours,” and the President said “You’ve allowed yourself to be in a very bad position … You don’t have the cards right now with us. You are gambling with the lives of millions, you are gambling with World War Three. And what you are doing is very disrespectful to this country.” The Vice President then asked if Ukraine had ever thanked the US (in fact, Zelensky has repeatedly thanked the US and had just posted thanks again for “bicameral and bipartisan support for Ukraine throughout all three years of Russia’s full-scale aggression” immediately before the meeting). The meeting ended with the President saying “you’re either going to make a deal or we are out and if we’re out, you’ll fight it out. I don’t think it’s going to be pretty, but you’ll fight it out. But you don’t have the cards [until] we sign that deal. You’re in a much better position [with the deal], but you’re not acting at all thankful and that’s not a nice thing.” Bad as the meeting was, in some ways the worse came later. On social media, the President wrote that Zelensky “is not ready for peace if America is involved, because he feels our involvement gives him a big advantage in negotiations” and repeating that “I am in the middle, I am for both Ukraine and Russia” – a remarkable statement signaling the depth of the shift in official attitudes to the war and towards both countries, the aggressor and the victim of aggression. The President later added that President Zelensky had to stop saying “negative things” about Putin and instead say publicly that he wanted “peace.” All this positioned the US as wanting its aid returned (several times over) but possibly unwilling to continue that effective support for Ukraine through negotiations and declining to put similar public pressure on Russia. The return on the investment for the US in Ukrainian and European security would come back literally in dollars rather than continued support for the side it and its European and other allies has thus far supported. Zelensky tried to make up for the meeting quickly, writing thanks to the President, Congress, and the American people; “Ukraine needs just and lasting peace, and we are working exactly for that.” In Ukraine, Zelensky found some support; as one analyst wrote, “Zelensky was not only himself but also embodied each of us: When your main ‘card’ is your right to have your own country, your dignity, and the courage to defend it.’” Administration officials noted that the idea was first to have the economic agreement (arguing that it is a form of security guarantee) and then to negotiate security guarantees, but Ukraine feared that signing the economic partnership gave up leverage for negotiations on security guarantees. The President also said that Zelensky could “come back” when he was ready for peace (and to sign the minerals deal). After the meeting, President Zelensky wrote that “Ukraine is ready to come to the negotiating table as soon as possible to bring lasting peace closer . . . My team and I stand ready to work under President Trump’s strong leadership to get a peace that lasts.” He proposed a “first stage” along the lines of President Macron’s proposed truce, adding that “[w]e really do value how much America has done to help Ukraine maintain its sovereignty and independence. And we remember the moment when things changed when President Trump provided Ukraine with Javelins. We are grateful for this. Our meeting in Washington, at the White House on Friday, did not go the way it was supposed to be. It is regrettable that it happened this way. It is time to make things right. We would like future cooperation and communication to be constructive.” Still, the US suspended military aid (apparently without consultation with NATO or allies such as Poland) and cut off (officially, a “pause” in) intelligence sharing with Ukraine, at least to the extent of helping with targeting HIMARS missiles against Russian locations to which President Biden had agreed once North Korean troops began fighting alongside Russia. National Security Advisor Mike Waltz said the US is “reviewing all aspects” of the intelligence relationship with Ukraine while also continuing negotiations on a minerals deal and what was described as “a potential peace deal with Russia.” Waltz predicted “movement in very short order.” Director of Central Intelligence John Ratcliffe said that the pause was deigned to give President Zelensky “a chance to think about” demonstrating commitment “to the peace process.” The action clearly hurt Ukraine’s ability to defend itself and in particular to protect its gains in the Kursk salient which is a key bargaining chip on territory in any negotiations with Russia. The US suggested it could lift the ban once it could “nail down these negotiations,” likely including the minerals deal, but the episode and others suggest the US role is shifting from a supporter of Ukraine to a more neutral, if not in fact neutral, broker – a position which almost by definition shifts the balance in favor of Russia. All of this happened after the bilateral meeting failed; at the same time, post hoc ergo propter hoc is a logical fallacy: had the meeting gone well, would the US have taken a stronger military position in support of Ukraine? Or was it simply designed to mark an end to “war” and the beginning of a posture of “peace” – at which point the US could easily have reduced aid and intelligence sharing on the ground that Ukraine had no further reason to target Russia? Connected with this was the strange beginning to the meeting, in which the President criticized President Zelensky for visiting the White House in his typical military fatigues (symbolizing continued war) rather than a suit (symbolizing submission to a new posture of “peace”). In practice, if Russia were to escalate attacks during negotiations, would the US respond by supporting Ukraine militarily, or would the pressure be instead simply to achieve a quick ceasefire or agreement? Militarily, Russia has ramped up the air war and continued attacks on energy infrastructure, including a very large attack on March 7. (Mirage aircraft operated by Ukrainians intercepted Russian cruise missiles, showing the importance of Western-provided aircraft to the conflict.) Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdo?an joined the French and Ukrainian call for a sea and air truce as well as a ceasefire. (In a rhetorical shift, the President threatened “large-scale Banking Sanctions, Sanctions, and Tariffs on Russia” because “Russia is absolutely ‘pounding’ Ukraine on the battlefield [.]” But strong sanctions in these areas are already in place, and Russian exports to the US are only $3 billion – new sanctions would have limited effect and not match the impact on Ukraine from suspension of aid.) On March 7, President Zelensky announced travel to Saudi Arabia to meet with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Sultan and then meet US officials, writing that Ukraine “will continue to work constructively for a swift and reliable peace,” a position that focuses on durability of peace rather than simply a long-term ceasefire that could leave Ukraine exposed and without effective Western security guarantees. In essence, this may set up two parallel tracks for diplomacy rather than a single track with Ukraine participating as other Western leaders want. Separately, the President stated his own view: “I think Ukraine wants to make a deal because they don’t have a choice. I also think that Russia wants to make a deal because in a certain different way – a different way that only I know – they have no choice either.” This acknowledgement of Russian eagerness for a deal only highlights the pressure on Ukraine, the absence of similar pressure on Russia (for instance, to stop air attacks), and the dramatic shifts in US policy. The meeting hardened European support for Ukraine, particularly after the other events of February. Norway, Denmark, Estonia, and other countries pledged further military aid; even neutral Ireland will donate military equipment to Ukraine. UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer said that Europe is “at a crossroads in history” and that Europe would work to develop a plan and discuss it with the US. The plan is expected to include explicit security guarantees from European countries in a “coalition of the willing” which Starmer stated the UK would “back with boots on the ground and planes in the air”; Italian Prime Minister Georgia Meloni even suggested extending NATO’s Article V collective defense guarantee to Ukraine without Ukraine formally joining the Alliance. Still, the UK Government also stated that a “lasting and durable peace” will require US involvement; without it, Europe “will struggle to get that durable peace” and expressed concern that “a short pause will simply allow the Russian forces to reconstitute, to rearm, to regroup and then to attack again” – the danger of a “frozen” conflict or ceasefire. At the EU, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen proposed increasing EU defense spending by up to €800 billion, saying “[t] his is a moment for Europe, and we are ready to step up [.]” Achieving that sum will be difficult, but European NATO Allies are also under pressure to increase their own defense spending in advance of an expected increase in NATO’s formal target for defense spending beyond the current 2 percent at the NATO Summit in June. Politically, the major European powers seek to put pressure on Russia and to work to influence US policy in a more pro-Ukraine direction, even accepting (however unhappily) a US minerals deal with Ukraine as a price for the continued US involvement and support for which they hope. Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen spoke for many in Europe by saying she has “never believed that this war is primarily about Ukraine. You are paying the price for it, but this war is about Russia. It’s about the imperial dream, and therefore I find it very difficult to trust Putin and to trust Russia. And it goes without saying that nothing should be negotiated without Ukraine, not only at the table, but in the center of the table.” In similar terms, President Zelensky spoke on Fox News, recalling President Ronald Reagan’s view that “peace is more than just an absence of war” and highlighting Russia’s record of breaking ceasefire agreements. It seems reasonable to think the US and Ukraine will reach agreement on a minerals deal. But will the US then resume military aid or simply continue pressuring Ukraine? The military dimension of the conflict – “the progress of our arms, on which all else depends,” as Lincoln wrote in his Second Inaugural – remains significant factor to the eventual outcome. As the air attacks show, ending US military assistance to Ukraine would clearly weaken Ukraine and restrict the progress of its arms in defending its territory and people. The danger is that it would put Ukraine in a weaker position in advance of negotiations, rather than the US supporting the country as it prepares for what could be long and difficult negotiations. In that shift – from proposing peace from a position of relative strength rather than one of weakness – may lie the contours of the negotiations and Ukraine’s future.
Key Insights
The Issues at Stake
A Minerals Deal?
The Political Dimension
An Extraordinary Meeting
The Meeting’s Aftermath
Next Steps
European Support for Ukraine
Conclusion
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